(In a countermove, Poland has just built a pipeline to Norway to secure another source of gas.) In the event of a Russian provocation, would Germany back deterrence or call for dialog and compromise? Germany’s shilly-shallying over Ukraine, which included banning Estonia from donating some much-needed howitzers to the beleaguered Ukrainians, have intensified doubts. Other countries in the region see them as a grave threat, entrenching the Kremlin’s dominance of the region’s energy supply. Germany has backed the two Nord Stream natural gas pipelines along the Baltic seabed. Its size and location would add crucial heft, but the other countries around the Baltic Sea are privately mistrustful of decision-makers in Berlin. The black hole in the region’s security is Germany. Their combined defense spending is around half of Russia’s-but the Kremlin has global ambitions, such as space weapons, a blue-water navy, and a strategic nuclear arsenal. Combined, Poland plus the Nordic countries and three Baltic states have a greater GDP than Russia’s. Denmark has upended its previous defense posture, which discounted any need for territorial and regional defense. Neighboring Norway, though not a littoral state, is closely involved in Baltic Sea security through its logistical, intelligence, and military aviation capabilities. These two non-NATO countries have close military ties with each other as well as NATO. Since 1991, NATO has been an organization designed for peace, not war-a dangerously outdated assumption.Īcross the Baltic Sea, Sweden and Finland have also been boosting their spending. These funds are spent wisely, including on modern weaponry that could at least slow, and thus help deter, a Russian attack. The Baltic states and Poland play their part too: Their defense budgets exceed the minimum 2 percent of GDP mandated by NATO. In nearby Poland, the United States has a more substantial presence of 5,000 service members. These units obviously cannot withstand a Russian assault they are there to make sure the Kremlin knows an attack on the Baltic states would also be an attack on other NATO members. NATO allies have stationed so-called enhanced forward presence tripwire forces, roughly 1,000 troops strong, in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Army commander in Europe and now my colleague at the Center for European Policy Analysis, I have spent the past year deep in the weeds, looking at the problems of Baltic Sea regional security and how to fix them. Solving this requires more than a one-off, reactive deployment. Regional security in the Baltic Sea has been a problem for much longer than the current standoff with Russia. These moves, though desirable, are belated and insufficient. military personnel are on heightened alert, ready to deploy to the region as part of NATO’s 40,000-strong Response Force. At bases elsewhere in Europe and the United States, 8,500 U.S. Air Force F-15 fighters arrived in Estonia as part of a wide-ranging reassurance effort. Years of cost-cutting, timidity, and wishful thinking by NATO governments make it harder.Īs the Russian military buildup around Ukraine raises fears of a broader East-West security crisis, NATO allies are hastening to bolster the Baltic states’ defenses while non-NATO members Sweden and Finland are tightening their ties with the alliance. Doing that for the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania-three thinly populated states squeezed between Russia, Belarus, and the Baltic Sea-is hard. NATO’s Article 5 pledges the alliance to defend its members. xxv and 368 pages.Nowhere is the credibility of the United States and its allies at greater risk than in the Baltic Sea region. ![]() Kivinen, Markku & Humphreys, Brendan (eds.). Ninna Mörner et al., (Södertörn University: Stockholm, 2021). A Comparative Study on Memory Management in the Region, Eds. Examining a proposed link between cultural heritage and the futureĬultural Heritage and the Future, Cornelius Holtorf & Anders Högberg, eds., (London & New York: Routledge, 2021), 256 pages.Ī multifaceted picture of the memory processes in Eastern Europe.ĬBEES Annual Report 2020: Constructions and Instrumentalization of the Past. 258 pages.ĭefining the future for the people. The Future of the Soviet Past: The Politics of History in Putin’s Russia Anton Weiss-Wendt & Nanci Adler, eds., Bloomington, Indiana University Press 2021. Putin’s authoritarian turn justified by the past Targeting Ukrainians that praise the armed resistance to USSR. Jansson’s Foundation for the promotion of historical research on Åland, 2021), 95 pages ![]() The Future Conditions for the Åland Autonomy, Bjarne Lindström and Göran Lindholm (Olof M.
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